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Abstract 
 
Purpose – In the light of strong policy emphasis on quality and safety in the nursing 
care of patients in hospital settings, this paper focuses on the factors affecting the 
adoption of innovative quality assurance technologies. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Two sets of complementary literatures were mined 
for key themes. Next, new empirical insights were sought. Data gathering was 
conducted in three phases. The first involved contact with NHS Technology Hubs and 
other institutions which had insights into leading centres in quality assurance 
technologies. The second phase was a series of telephone interviews with lead nurses 
in those hospitals which were identified in the first phase as comprising the leading 
centres. The third phase comprised a series of face to face interviews with innovators 
and adopters of healthcare quality assurance technologies in five hospital trusts.   
 
Findings – There were three main sets of findings. First, despite the strong policy 
push and the templates established at national level, there were significant variations 
in the nature and robustness of the quality assurance toolkits that were developed, 
adapted and adopted. Second, in most of the adopting cases there were important 
obstacles to the full adoption of the toolkits that were designed. Third, the extent and 
nature of the ambition of the developers varied dramatically – some wished to see 
their work impacting widely across the health service; others had a number of 
different reasons for wanting to restrict the impact of their work.  
 
Originality/value – The general concerns about front-line care and the various 
inquiries into care quality failures emphasise the need for improved and consistent 
care quality assurance methodologies and practice.  The technology adoption 
literature gives only partial insight into the nature of the challenges; this paper offers 
specific insights into the factors inhibiting the full adoption of quality assurance 
technologies in ward-based care.   
 
Keywords – Technology, Adoption, Adaptation, Quality Assurance, Quality Audi 
Introduction 
 
Quality of care has accelerated to the top of the health agenda in recent years; it is 
currently a topic of major public concern. This is a phenomenon shared by many 
countries (Squires 2010). In the UK, quality assurance for clinical care was stipulated 
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as a priority for board directors of hospital trusts on at least equal par with financial 
focus (Appointments Commission/DH 2010). It has been given a high profile as a 
result of the Public Inquiry chaired by Robert Francis QC into failings at the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust in central England which builds on his earlier 
inquiry which reported in 2009 (Francis 2009). The publication of the Public Inquiry 
will focus even more attention on these matters. Concerns about quality also 
periodically emerge as one of the top priorities in healthcare as a result of outbreaks of 
hospital acquired infections such as C Difficile or MRSA. These can threaten the 
reputation of a hospital and lead to the dismissal of its top managers. Serious 
untoward incidents, such as the application of the wrong clinical procedures also give 
rise to major scandals. Inadequacy of care and neglect of patients can cause injury and 
acute concern among patients and the wider public. For these and other reasons, 
technologies designed to help provide clinical assurance go to the core mission of 
healthcare organisations. While other factors are at play such as the recruitment and 
training of nurses, staffing levels and prevailing cultures, systematic quality assurance 
methodologies have been deemed worthy of special focus. They allow methodical, 
consistent and evidence-based protocols to be applied to day to day care on the 
hospital wards. These technologies draw on tried and tested approaches as practised in 
high risk industries such as airlines and oil and chemical processing.  
 
Yet, despite the rationales above and in spite of extensive national policy pressures 
and inducements to introduce quality assurance technologies, their take up has 
remained patchy. This would appear to be a considerable conundrum: an evident 
priority, a strong policy pressure and a high level of public concern, yet little evidence 
of the adoption of innovative solutions. It may be argued that this reflects a wider 
pattern of  the ‘non-spread of innovations’ in the National Health Service (NHS) 
(Ferlie et al. 2005). As such it represents an opportunity to reveal some of the key 
underlying forces at play. 
 
It has been noted that the NHS is missing out on the huge potential advantage 
afforded by its national character as a result of its relative failure to readily adopt 
innovations developed by its leading centres. Lord Darzi referred to the ‘reluctance 
within the NHS to adopt new products and processes’ (Darzi 2008). The phenomenon 
extends beyond the UK; it may be a sector characteristic rather than a national 
characteristic. The ‘change-averse’ nature of healthcare has also been noted by 
Christensen et al. (2000).  
 
Whatever the source of the problem, the difficulties in rolling-out consistent care 
quality approaches in health services will continue to attract attention. The purpose of 
this paper is to shed light on the nature and extent of the challenge. In a context where 
there is a high level of public anxiety, a strong central policy push, and a set of 
readily-available methodologies, what factors might explain why diffusion and 
adoption of good practice in this critical domain is so tentative, perfunctory and 
incomplete? 
 
We seek to attend to this research agenda by drawing on two types of literature and a 
number of case studies. The first set of literature that might be expected to illuminate 
the problem is that concerned with diffusion and adoption of innovations across 
industry sectors in general (Meyer and Goes 1988; Rogers 2003) and more 
specifically on adoption processes and barriers in healthcare (Greenhalgh et al. 2004; 
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Gravel et al. 2006; Adams et al. 2011; Johnston et al. 2000). The second set of 
literature is that which has concerned itself directly and specifically with quality 
assurance methods in healthcare (Donabedian 1980; Harvey 1991; Balogh 1998; 
Balogh 2001; D'Avolio 2008). The case study evidence will focus on five cases 
selected on the basis of theoretical sampling. They each had made some attempt to 
adopt or adapt a systematic quality assurance technology and their experiences in so 
doing are used as sources of insight into the processes and factors at play. 
 
But, before examining these sources of evidence we begin with the policy context. 
This is important because it establishes a powerful inducement for hospitals to adopt 
quality assurance methodologies. Failure to adopt under such circumstances becomes 
all the more perplexing and, in turn, potentially revealing.  
 
The policy context 
 
Various attempts have been made to introduce quality assurance tools and systems 
over the past twenty to thirty years. There was an upsurge in interest in their 
development and use in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Harvey, 1991; Koch 1992; 
Balogh 2001). In the UK, Health Care Acquired Infections (HCAI) such as 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) became of increasing concern during the 1990s and 
its reduction became a national NHS target. One significant response to the rising 
concern was the creation of ‘modern matrons’ in 2001 with a specific remit to lead 
clinical teams in preventing and reducing such infections (Currie 2009). These 
matrons were meant to be ‘highly visible, accessible and authoritative figures’ 
(Department of Health 2001) who would focus on the task of cleanliness and related 
HCAI concerns. To help supplement such initiatives, continued efforts have been 
made to introduce new versions of quality assurance toolkits for clinical care. 
 
The macro policy context is illustrated by the specific initiatives and campaigns led by 
the Department of Health to encourage and guide practice in relation to healthcare 
quality assurance. One example is the Department of Health’s package of measures 
labelled ‘High Impact Interventions’. This initiative was a Department of Health 
sponsored campaign designed to focus attention on the reduction of infection risks. It 
sought an evidence-based approach to key clinical procedures. The High Impact 
Interventions approach was originally launched in 2005 as part of the ‘Saving Lives’ 
initiative. Each intervention in relation to a particular care bundle comprises a set of 
clinical guidelines, an audit sheet and a means to collect and collate the results. There 
is a statutory requirement that registered providers must audit compliance to key 
policies and procedures for infection prevention (Health and Social Care Act 2008). 
Despite this, in the year 2010 to 2011 only 11 hospital trusts out of 350 were able to 
record zero incidence of MRSA. A second example is the Department of Health’s 
influential document entitled ‘Standards for Better Health’ which became operational 
in April 2005. These standards were used as the basis for the inspection and audit 
regime used by the then Healthcare Commission and which in turn provided the basis 
for the Care Quality Commission’s work. 
 
Another highly relevant Department of Health sponsored initiative in this area was 
‘Essence of Care’ which was first launched in 2001 and has since been updated and 
refined. The 2010 update uses 12 benchmarks designed to ‘help practitioners to take a 
structured approach to sharing and comparing practice, enabling them to identify the 
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best and to develop action plans to remedy poor practice’ It aims to ‘support localised 
quality improvement, by providing a set of established and refreshed benchmarks 
supporting front line care’ (Department of Health 2010). They provide benchmarks 
for care in core areas including: respect and dignity, the care environment, 
communication with patients, food and drink, the prevention and management of pain, 
record keeping, hygiene and so on. Essence of Care can be variously used as a check 
list, an audit tool, a benchmark, an educational tool, a root cause analysis tool when 
examining incidents, and or as a means of providing evidence of compliance with 
Care Quality Commission (CQC) criteria. More generic guidance on quality 
measurement has come from the National Institute for Innovation and Improvement 
(Pencheon 2008) and the King’s Fund (Raleigh 2010). 
 
These kinds of centre-led initiatives have provided the backcloth for local efforts in 
developing healthcare assurance technologies designed to meet local needs. We turn 
now to a consideration of the literature which has addressed the wider question of the 
limited adoption of innovative technologies in healthcare organisations. 
 
The literature on the adoption of innovation in health service 
organisations 
 
There have been a number of significant systematic reviews of the literatures on 
diffusion and adoption of innovations in healthcare and it is not intended that a further 
review be attempted here (Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Robert et 
al. 2009). The Robert et al (2009) study focused in particular on ‘technological 
innovations’ which they defined as ‘a device, procedure or organisational support 
system that is perceived as new by the stakeholders’ (2009:6). They found that the 
dynamics of innovation are more complex in multi-professional organisations such as 
hospitals. They also note that clinicians and associated professionals enjoy 
considerable autonomy and discretion and that these freedoms can both impede as 
well as promote innovation. 
 
But the processes involved in how or why NHS organisations decide to adopt, or not 
adopt, technological innovations were found to remain unclear from the studies that 
were reviewed (Robert et al 2009: 122). They identified shortcomings in many studies 
of technology adoption including most notably the perspective which viewed these as 
one-off events rather than a process; the conceptualisation of organisations as unitary 
actors; the relative neglect of politics and power in healthcare organisations and the 
perception of individuals within organisations as passive recipients of innovations. 
The authors called for more rigorous qualitative studies to develop better explanatory 
models of the organisational factors at play. They cite Fitzgerald (2002: 1433) who 
contended ‘we need to know more about how adoption decisions are made within 
multi-professional groups and within large and complex organisations (Fitzgerald et 
al. 2002).  
 
An earlier systematic literature review of diffusion of innovations in health service 
organisations noted the range of variables at play (Greenhalgh et al. 2004). Again the 
emphasis was upon adoption as a process rather than an event. Factors identified as 
seemingly relevant in shaping the course of action included, inter alia, the nature of 
the innovation itself, the characteristics of the adopters; the role of champions and 
opinion leaders; and the organisational context. Types of innovations that were more 
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easily adopted tended to be those which were perceived to have a clear and 
unambiguous advantage; were compatible with the values norms and practices of the 
adopters and their organisation; were perceived by key players as easy to use; allowed 
users to experiment, refine and adapt. The adopters themselves tended to have higher 
tolerance of ambiguity; have intellectual ability; and to have particular learning styles. 
The adoption process was found to be messy rather than linear, users seek reassurance 
at multiple stages of adoption. In addition, the organisational context has to be 
receptive and allowing. Key factors at play here include a culture that supports 
capturing and sharing new knowledge; leadership which promotes knowledge sharing; 
organisations which support training and a climate which is conducive to risk taking.  
 
Provider organizations are the agent adopters of innovations and understanding the 
factors that inhibit or facilitate this process is important when addressing the key three 
issues of cost, quality, and access (Rye and Kimberly 2007). A recent study of 
technology adoption in the NHS noted that centralised dissemination of evidence had 
little impact and what mattered more was ‘practice-based and peer-mediated’ local 
dissemination processes (Kyratsis et al. 2012). 
 
These reviews of adoption within healthcare can be seen as located within the broader 
category of research on technology adoption and diffusion more generally. Hugely 
influential here has been the work by Rogers (2003). He most notably identified the 
‘attributes’ of innovations that help explain their rate and extent of adoption. The key 
attributes were: relative advantage (using a range of measures such as impact and 
cost); compatibility with existing practices; complexity (the degree to which the 
innovation is perceived as difficult to understand or use), trialability (the extent to 
which an innovation can be experimented with and experienced in practice), 
observability (the degree to which results are evident to others), re-invention (the 
perceived scope for modification and adaption). Rogers construed these attributes 
from his review of a wide range of literature reporting empirical studies. These six 
attributes have been widely used by many subsequent researchers of innovation. We 
too draw upon them as plausible factors to be explored in the setting of quality 
assurance technologies in the NHS.  
 
The literatures outlined above, while powerful and influential in addressing the 
process of innovation diffusion and adoption have curiously been rarely used by the 
rather separate literature attending to quality assurance technologies in healthcare. Yet 
this latter literature domain has some separate strengths and relevance to our mission 
which make it worthy of attention and use. It is described in the next section. 
 
The literature on healthcare quality assurance technologies  
 
As mentioned, this literature tends to remain separate from, and to rarely cross-refer 
to, the wider innovation adoption literature. It also tends to be more prescriptive. It 
has a fairly clear purpose and agenda: to construct and specify ‘standards’ of service 
delivery; to enable conformance with top-down imposed reporting requirements; to 
provide nurses and other clinical practitioners with clear protocols and guidance 
which can enable them to strive for consistency of practice; provide a basis for 
continuous improvement and staff development.  
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An influential source contends that quality assurance has three main component 
elements: structure, process and outcomes (Donabedian 1980). ‘Structure’ refers to 
the physical components of care including the organizational aspects. This includes, 
for example, whether a hospital ward has the appropriate physical resources to hand. 
‘Process’ refers to behaviours and actions. This includes performance of care 
procedures, the preparation of care plans and evaluation processes. ‘Outcomes’ refers 
to changes to patient care and also to changes in clinicians’ knowledge, skills and 
attitudes.  
Elaborating on this list of purposes, Marker suggests that a quality assurance 
technology should enable: standards development, performance appraisal, audit of 
performance achieved, learning and development, active problem identification and 
risk management (Marker 1987). If these are the component tasks and functions to be 
accomplished, then in addition the methods have been also identified. These are said 
to include, most notably: the establishment of general principles, surveys of patients 
and staff, problem identification, and experimentation (Green 1986).  
Assurance and assessment requires some notion of the standards of care being sought. 
Standards have to be defined and written. These statements specify the criteria for 
assessment. This in turn allows for levels of attainment ranging from high to low, or 
excellent to minimally acceptable. Assigning such levels may be achieved through 
measurement which in turn may mean specifying the ways by which numbers (i.e. 
scores) are attributed to behaviours, structures and outcomes (Green 1986).  
This literature suggests that the problems to be overcome include identifying which 
key activity or other variable is to be measured, which instrument to use in order to 
measure that activity, and issues concerning sampling intervals and inter-rater 
reliability (Koch 1992). It has been suggested that each of the above component 
elements may be conceived of as parts of an ongoing cycle – from definition of 
standards, through assessment of practice and on to planned changes in response to 
the analysis (Balogh 2001).  
The ultimate purposes are said to include patient safety, organisational survival, 
conformance with external regulation, continuous improvement, and, potentially, the 
aggregation of results to allow inter-organisational performance.  Medical informatics 
may seek to utilise clinical assessment data to enable statistical analysis of clinical 
outcomes and performance measurement at organisational and clinical unit levels 
(D'Avolio 2008).  
The above specification of characteristics of many quality assurance programmes 
offers a framework against which case examples can be compared. In the main, they 
constitute a normative approach where a higher authority defines and writes the 
standards and then proceeds to arrange assessment and audit of behaviour and 
performance against these standards.  But there are variants to this (Koch 1992). For 
example, the focus may shift to an experimental and evidence-based approach where 
nurses and other clinical practitioners may be involved in trialling different practices 
and noting their outcomes. Or the emphasis may be placed on problem identification 
so as to avoid untoward incidents, medication errors and infection risks. In practice, it 
has been noted that the main body of nursing literature concerns the setting of 
standards and ways of assessing and measuring performance against these standards  
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(Harvey 1991; Koch 1992). Regulation and professional standards represent two ways 
to seek quality assurance. But a third and potentially alternative - or complementary - 
way that is sometimes advocated, is competition. This market-bases aspect of driving 
up standards in healthcare is of course controversial and it is not the subject of this 
present study. 
A further issue concerns who ‘owns’ and sponsors the quality assurance technology. 
In past decades, district health authorities were often the owners and users because 
quality assurance was part of their performance management, inspection and audit 
regime. The authorities used a variety of tools some of which were essentially 
management control devices and others which leaned towards a nurse-focused 
developmental tool (Harvey 1991).  
Health care quality assurance tools are typically composites derived from multiple 
inputs – including, for example, direct observations through formal inspections by 
matrons and others, examination and audits of written records, and the use of staff and 
patient questionnaires.  
A further consideration is what happens to the data that is collected? More 
specifically, who has access to the data? In some systems the data is clearly part of the 
clinical governance and performance management system. Hence, it is made available 
in condensed form to the Trust Board and is used as a basis for reporting to external 
regulators and the Department of Health. In other cases, the results are seen as more 
confidential and are fed-back in a restricted way to the individual wards so that 
appropriate action can be taken to correct for any shortfalls against the standards. 
Nurses are reported as feeling stress and anxiety about assessment and reporting 
(Harvey 1991) and considerable effort is at times invested in seeking to assuage such 
anxieties. 
The above review of clinical quality assurance literature suggests that there are a 
number of significant variants and that each of these could be considered as important 
design choices for product development innovators. Table 1 below summarises these 
variations. We term these ‘design choices’. 
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Table 1: Clinical Quality Assurance Tool Design Choices 
 
1. Wide or narrowly focused tool? For example, narrow focus on infection 
control or wide span covering many 
aspects of care quality reporting 
2. Top down or bottom up development? Imposed or various degrees of co-
development and staff engagement 
3. A control, quality assurance focus or 
improvement/development focus? 
Performance measurement or 
improvement/learning focus 
4. Range of data sources to call upon? Observation, interviews, questionnaires, 
written care records etc 
5. Frequency of audit? Annual or more frequent 
6. Complex and holistic or simple to use? Elaborate and all-embracing or specific 
and tightly focused 
7. Nurses only or wider? Is the design purpose to improve nursing 
practice or is the aim to provide wider 
reporting and assurance processes 
8. Methods of audit? External auditors, matrons from other 
wards/care groups? 
9. Transparency of data when collected? Feedback only to specific ward or wider? 
10. Encourage some internal competition 
or not? 
This relates to the question about 
transparency of results 
11. Challenging targets or minimum 
standard thresholds? 
Conformance with a set standard or 
more? 
12. Extent of ambition – own department 
and division, whole hospital, whole trust 
or beyond? 
Perceived scope of influence: immediate 
work team or an intent to innovate and 
develop and product for use across 
multiple organisations? 
13. Involvement with commercial 
partner? 
Nature of relationship with commercial 
partner; remit given to that partner 
 
 
This schema of design choices drawn from the healthcare quality assurance literature 
can be located within and alongside the wider literature on the diffusion and adoption 
of innovations discussed earlier in order to provide a richer agenda for research. The 
apparent problem of embedding and sustaining high levels of quality in front-line 
services may be tackled anew by drawing on both of these different bodies of 
literature.  
 
As noted in the introduction, there are signs of high levels of concern about the 
quality of care. There is uncertainty about the sources of the problem and so the 
difficulties in disseminating consistent care quality approaches will continue to attract 
attention. The research and the practical challenge is the clear identification of those 
factors that might explain why diffusion and adoption of good practice is so 
problematic. The context is one of high public anxiety, a strong central policy push, 
and a set of readily-available methodologies. Drawing on the two literatures outlined 
above and a study of five cases we seek to shed some new light on this challenge. In 
the next section, the research methods adopted for the study of the cases are 
described. 
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Research methods  
 
The empirical part of the research was designed to allow insights drawn from the two 
literatures outlined above to be utilised as resources in the quest to answer the 
research question concerning what factors might explain why diffusion and adoption 
of good practice in quality assurance is so problematic. The converse question was 
also addressed – i.e. what factors seem to enable the adoption of these technologies. 
 
A qualitative case study method was at the core of the design (Yin 1994). Case 
selection was obviously a key consideration. This task began with the identification of 
leading examples of quality assurance technologies by contacting a number of 
innovation hubs. The aim at this stage was to gain a broad picture of who was doing 
what in this area of activity. This was a general intelligence gathering stage. Basic 
details were collected about which hospital trusts had most notably developed and 
implemented innovative clinical assurance technologies. This initial identification 
work comprised the first phase and as a result of this work two hospital trusts were 
selected for attention as examples of innovative quality assurance technologies. 
 
In the second phase of work, the two nominated trusts (A and B) were contacted by 
telephone and their quality assurance innovators interviewed. At this stage, data was 
collected about the nature of the innovation, its purpose, the factors which prompted 
its development, its take-up within the trust and its take up by other trusts. Running in 
parallel with this, commercial companies which had also played a part – usually by 
providing software development - were also interviewed. At this stage also, 
information about the wider picture of developments in health care quality assurance 
nationally was sourced from three independent experts with backgrounds at senior 
level in quality assurance practices in the NHS. At this stage also three hospital trusts 
were identified as adopters of the innovative technology developed by Trust A. For 
reasons that will become clear in the case descriptions, there were no adopters of the 
innovation developed by Case B.  
 
In a third phase, a series of telephone interviews was conducted with the three 
hospitals trusts which been identified as adopters of the package designed by Trust A. 
Arrangements were then made for site visits and face to face interviews with all five 
Trusts. This site-based research comprised the fourth and main phase of the work. Ten 
face to face interviews were conducted at this stage – two interviews per hospital 
trust. In each instance the ‘technology champion’ (developer or principal adopter) was 
the first interviewee. This was normally the most senior nurse who had overall 
responsibility for quality assurance throughout the trust. The questions which guided 
the semi-structured interviews were (1) what factors had prompted the attempt to 
introduce an innovative quality assurance package? (2) what were the main 
characteristic features of the package and how did these differ from previous practice? 
(3) what were its advantages and disadvantages? (4) what was the process in its 
introduction and who played a part in this process of development, adoption and/or 
adaption? (5) what factors helped or hindered the development and adoption of the 
innovation?  
 
The other interviews in each of these trusts were with other senior nurses who had 
responsibility for using these innovative technologies. The questions which guided 
these interviews were drawn from the clinical quality assurance design choices as 
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shown in Table 1 above. Thus, this phase of the interview was designed to capture 
data about what choices had been made with respect to the breadth of focus of the 
tool, the data that was fed-in to the tool, the frequency of audit, the complexity of 
simplicity of the tool, the methods of the audit, the transparency and use of the data 
collected, responses of nurses who were assessed with the tool and perceptions of its 
outcomes. Thus, while the first set of interviews were based around a design 
perspective – i.e. what choices were made on a range of identified criteria, the second 
round of interviews focused on the perspective of those senior nurses who had a 
responsibility to use the technology in their quality assurance work. The interviews 
were conducted in a manner conducive to allowing informants to reveal their 
priorities and their concerns in as open a manner as possible.  
 
The interview data were supplemented with demonstrations of the quality assurance 
packages on the hospital trusts’ intranets. Additionally, documentary sources 
including extracts from the technology packages alongside reports describing the 
technologies which had been prepared for clinical governance committees and boards 
were collected and scrutinised. In two of the cases, internal evaluation reports on the 
workings of the quality assurance systems were also analysed. 
 
Data were recorded in hand-written form by entering responses into pre-printed pro-
forma interview sheets which had the main question areas set-out in the left column of 
a series of data sheets. The first few interviews were recorded but it became evident 
that the respondents were guarded in their responses. The topic areas were seen as 
sensitive and respondents were less forthcoming and open than they were when 
handwritten notes only were being used. This has not always been the case with other 
respondents in other studies; the sensitivity seemed to reflect the role location of these 
respondents. They were in senior and responsible positions but they were not at top 
policy making levels where consideration of options and experience in expansive 
reflective debate is more the norm. Rather, they were the custodians and executors of 
their hospital trust regulatory regimes and they seemed to want the security of having 
made the right choices which they could defend. Their expressions of uncertainty and 
critique tended to be heavily laden with qualifications and apologies that this as their 
‘personal opinion’ or ‘personal view’ and was often accompanied by a degree of 
discomfort. 
 
There was an added advantage in the use of handwritten responses onto pro-forma 
sheets in that subsequent data analysis was made much easier because responses had 
been organised as it was entered during the interview. The two literatures were found 
to have adequately covered the main range of issues and back-to-basics content 
analysis as recommend by some researchers was not required (Patton 1990). This 
method of data collection and organising was only used for the main phase, the 
interviews with NHS national level experts and with the commercial providers of 
technology were more traditional free-flowing in format so as to enable novel and 
unexpected themes to emerge. As the number of interviews of this latter type was 
relatively few, the data analysis was manageable using more grounded approaches 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967).  
 
Findings: Development and adoption processes 
issues in the case organisations 
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The two literature domains outlined earlier are different but complementary and they 
are each drawn upon to inform the case analyses which follow. First, it describes the 
general context within which clinical assurance toolkits are introduced. Second, it sets 
out the framework of issues to be considered. And third it indicates the range of 
design choices which have to be made by both developers and adopters/adapters.  
 
In this section we now turn to an examination of each of the five case studies. The 
cases taken together reveal:  
 
(i) That despite the templates established at national level as described above there are 
significant variations in the nature of the toolkits that were developed;  
(ii) That in many of the cases there were important obstacles to the full adoption of 
the toolkits that were designed;  
(iii) That the extent and nature of the ambition of the developers varied dramatically – 
some wished to see their work impacting widely across the health service, others had 
a number of different reasons for wanting to restrict the impact of their work. Despite 
the variations in scope of ambition, the overall rate of ‘adoption’ remained low. The 
analysis below seeks to reveal why. 
 
In the majority of cases, the healthcare quality assurance technologies examined in the 
cases researched for this project were found to have been developed by nurse leaders 
in conjunction with experts in IT and others and the main purpose and target group 
was mainly quality assurance for nursing on wards and departments. There were a few 
variants where the target groups included doctors and professions allied to medicine 
such as occupational therapists. Again, in the main, though not exclusively, the 
underlying frameworks had originated and/or been prompted by initiatives at the 
national level and sponsored by the Department of Health.  
 
The technologies were essentially local adaptations of national, top-down initiatives. 
This pattern is by no means unusual in the context of the NHS: to a very large extent, 
priorities are normally established at the centre. Rarely is it the case that a trust within 
the NHS sets off on a path which has not been signalled from above. The variations in 
their strategies, motivations and actions are revealing.  
 
Case A, City NHS FT 
 
In this and each of the cases, we present the findings organised around the five main 
questions listed earlier: (1) what factors had prompted the attempt to introduce an 
innovative quality assurance package? (2) what were the main characteristic features 
of the package and how did these differ from previous practice? (3) what were its 
advantages and disadvantages? (4) what was the process in its introduction and who 
played a part in this process of development, adoption and/or adaption? (5) what 
factors helped or hindered the development and adoption of the innovation?  
 
First, the driving factors. City NHS FT developed a clinical assurance toolkit in 
response to a number of background factors and triggers – a key one being the 
aforementioned ‘Standards for Better Health’.  The Trust as with other Trusts needed 
some means of organising its response to these externally led requirements. Around 
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the same time, the Trust experienced a higher than expected incidence of infections. A 
further prompt was the arrival of a new head of nursing who had been involved in a 
nation-wide project relating to clinical governance and nursing practice. So, the initial 
prompts to action were multiple and reinforcing. 
 
Second, the characteristic features of the innovation package. The twin central 
features of the toolkit were first, that it combined within one place a holistic, total 
view of clinical assurance issues and second that it allowed multiple sources of data to 
be used as evidence of performance against these measures.  The toolkit was evolved 
over the next three years and then an electronic version was developed in 
collaboration with the IT department. This electronic version has now been in 
operation for 4 years and it is used in all wards and all departments of the Trust. There 
is a central generic version and a number of specialised variants to meet the special 
needs of certain areas including inpatients and outpatients, maternity, day cases, 
operating theatres, critical care and the radiotherapy suite. The toolkit is mainly 
nursing focused at this point in time.  
 
The toolkit is characterised by a systematic itemisation of standards and against each 
standard a list of expected sources of evidence is listed (for example, evidence from 
matrons’ spot checks, from staff surveys, from records audits and from patient 
surveys). Each detailed standard is clustered under an organising heading (e.g. skin 
and wound management along with nutrition and hygiene care are clustered under a 
‘patient care’ standard). Each cluster or group of standards is then rated using a traffic 
light grading system. Red indicates urgent corrective action is required, yellow 
indicates further work needed with medium to low priority, green indicates that the 
ward or unit is functioning well on this standards, blue signals an area of excellence 
meriting wider sharing of good practice across the trust.  
 
The new quality assurance package combined a number of measurement techniques. 
These included:  a matron’s spot check of each ward or department; a checklist of 
questions for matrons to use in order to assess the awareness of different levels of 
staff about practical matters related to patient safety; a quarterly medicines 
management checklist; an audit of paper records showing, for example, whether 
patient observation charts were up to date and up to standard; staff perception 
questionnaires and patient questionnaires. 
 
The advantages were reported as the bringing together into one place and time a range 
of measures and standard practices which were previously fragmented or only 
partially completed. Sub-systems such as induction, training and development and 
standards reporting were seen as integrated. The disadvantages were perceived as few 
and these related to having to learn new ways of working. The results are used for 
multiple purposes including for practice improvement, and for upward reporting for 
clinical governance reporting as well as for accountability to external regulatory 
agencies such as the Care Quality Commission (CQC).  
 
The processes involved in its introduction and which of these helped or hindered were 
the next questions. The early phase of activity was driven by a small team. This 
comprised a handful of selected nurses and a staff member from the audit department. 
They developed a paper-based version of the toolkit by taking Standards for Better 
Health as a starting point. One aspect of their work was to translate these standards 
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into a form which allowed nursing care to be assessed on a regular basis. An 
important priority was to consider what kinds of evidence could be used in order to 
show compliance with the standards.  
 
The factors which helped the effective adoption and widespread use were reported as 
the way in which the innovation was seen as offering a solution to a known set of 
problems (infection rates, the need to show compliance with a multiplicity of 
standards etc). The adoption of the toolkit within the various departments and sites of 
this trust has been extensive. This can be explained by the support and indeed pressure 
from the higher levels of trust governance and also by the unusual supporting 
infrastructure in the shape of a ‘practice development unit’ which facilitates change of 
various kinds across the trust. The trust says that the system allows quality monitoring 
and continuous improvement by drilling down into the individual scores of the 
component elements of the standards even where the overall result for a standard is 
good. It is also claimed that the data allows for disentangling of whether a practice is 
being performed or not, how well the practice is being performed, and with what 
quality outcomes such as the number of medication errors. 
 
The current champions of the toolkit within the trust report that they continue to adapt 
it to reflect priorities at both national level and local levels. They say it is an ‘organic’ 
and not a ‘static’ tool. 
 
Despite the readiness of the originators to share their ideas (through workshops, by 
receiving visitors from other trusts and through the placement of their paper-based 
version with the NHS innovation hubs and a company specialising in NHS 
technologies), there has been little sustained attempt to exploit the innovation by 
selling it on to other trusts. There seems to be a genuine willingness to help other 
trusts adopt this or similar technologies if they wish to do so, but there is no apparent 
desire to actively market the ideas. As we will note later when looking at other cases, 
this openness to the spread of new ideas is not always replicated. The focus in City 
NHS FT is clearly upon quality improvement for the home trust and this runs 
alongside a willingness to help other NHS organisations make similar improvements. 
 
Despite this openness, the number of trusts which have made the decision to adopt 
this toolkit has been few (approximately half a dozen, whereas the commercial IT 
partners expected scores of adopters). Moreover, even those few which have adopted 
the toolkit have done so far less fully than was the case with the originating trust. We 
can now turn to an examination of three adopting cases.  
 
Case B, Riverside NHS FT 
 
Senior nurses in Case B had visited City NHS FT in order to make an assessment of 
the toolkit and they had subsequently made a conscious decision to adopt the 
technology. This case of the toolkit’s adoption was the clearest example that was 
found of a wholesale adoption with very few attempts to alter the package to any 
significant extent. The exact same set of standards was used along with the same 
methods of collecting the data to assess performance against these standards. It 
should, however, be noted that a key factor in the adoption decision appears to have 
been the fact that one of the senior nurses in Case B had previously worked in Case A 
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and thus had direct experience of the technology. When charged by her line manager 
to develop a clinical assurance tool she recommended the City NHS FT product. A 
small team visited the originating site and was sufficiently persuaded to make the 
adoption decision.   
 
A further important feature of this case was that Riverside was experiencing much 
more difficulty in ensuring active take-up and use of the toolkit across the trust than 
was the case in City. The senior nurse who had recommended adoption was a strong 
believer in, and advocate of, the toolkit. However, it was notable that adoption was 
really only secure in that division of the hospital where she had a direct responsibility 
and authority for clinical governance matters.  The other divisions were slow to adopt 
the technology. In part, this was because they had their own legacy systems which, in 
a more fragmented way, collected similar data.  They were reluctant to change over to 
a new system. This reluctance and scepticism extended to senior levels in these other 
divisions. Likewise, there was little sign of support from senior managers and 
directors in the trust. In seeking an explanation for the lack of progress in the adoption 
of the toolkit when compared with the first case it may also be suggested that the lack 
of the supporting infrastructure of a practice development unit meant that the 
champion of the toolkit was more of a lone voice. Ironically, experience with an 
existing system represented an obstacle. 
 
As a senior figure in just one of the three divisions, the technology champion had the 
authority and credibility to ensure its adoption within her division but not within the 
other divisions of the hospital trust.  This left the technology champion with a 
dilemma. One option was to restrict her aspiration for full adoption to her own 
division while leaving the other divisions to their own devices. Alternatively, aware of 
the organisation-wide use in her original trust she could seek to campaign for its wider 
adoption in order to exploit its full holistic potential – which included, as mentioned, 
board level reporting and external reporting to regulators such as CQC in addition to 
service improvement on the wards. The champion was aware of these options and 
seemed unsure as to which path to take. The main priority was effective utilisation 
within her own division. When pressed, it was apparent that there was no real interest 
in seeking wider diffusion into other NHS organisations.  
 
The champion argued that the toolkit was useful in bringing ‘everything of 
significance together in one place’ - and that it was simple to use. All relevant 
information needed to ensure conformity with expected standards was said to be made 
available through this tool. Despite these advantages she observed that ‘We are 
struggling to have it accepted at Trust level’.  Hence, this is a clear example of partial 
adoption. Senior managers and directors were ‘not yet fully behind it’. It was seen as 
‘just another initiative’.   
 
In response to these points of resistance one temptation was to evaluate it in a manner 
which emphasised its acceptability to staff. There was a possibility that rigour in such 
circumstances could be sacrificed as second order to acceptability. The results of the 
assessments are ‘posted on the walls in order to show nurses how well they have 
done’ (Modern Matron). At the same time, where results indicate that sufficient 
resources are not to hand, these data are used in order to take a more convincing case 
to management in order to secure these resources. This could involve staffing levels 
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and skill mix issues, single sex accommodation issues, lack of appropriate beds, as 
well as other equipment and materials.  
 
Part of the resistance from other divisions stemmed from an attachment to existing 
systems such as the national Essence of Care package discussed earlier. The 
technology champion in Case B was faced with a senior nurse colleague who had 
invested time in, and tended to favour the use of Essence of Care and was reluctant to 
see deviation or distraction from this extant programme. Thus, the existence of 
competing systems presents a problem to adoption. In the face of this, the toolkit 
champion was seeking periodically to seek additional sponsorship and ‘to light fires’ 
around the trust in order to garner support for a system which she believes 
encompasses and improves upon Essence of Care.  
 
Meanwhile, the uncertain and partial current level of adoption and support meant that 
only the paper version could be justified – investment in the electronic version was 
seen to require greater prior commitment. It was argued that there was a need to 
‘convince both hearts and minds if it was to be done well’.  
 
It was also argued that the toolkit allowed staff to make constructive suggestions for 
improvement and change without appearing to be ‘whinging’ – it gave legitimacy to 
critical reflection.  
 
There was no real appetite among the toolkit champions to press for wider adoption 
across the NHS. The motivation and the focus were very clearly upon divisional level 
improvement and assurance, followed by trust wide improvement and assurance. 
There was no perceived incentive to seek anything further outside the trust.  
 
Cases C and D: Two Partial Adopters 
 
These two cases can be seen as variants of Case B. The package they adopted was 
derived from Case A but in these latter two cases they had encountered even greater 
difficulties in embedding the innovation in their trusts. In consequence, they had 
settled for partial implementation both in the sense of only applying it to certain 
divisions and wards and also in the sense of only utilising parts of the package.  
 
The lessons to be learned from these two cases of partial adoption are that adoption 
requires political influence within the organisation. A simple appeal to a ‘better 
approach’ was not enough in either case. In both instances, the local champion was 
only able to extend the new practices within their immediate sphere of influence. In 
one instance this meant rolling-out the package within just two divisions of a five 
division trust. In the other instance, it meant wider coverage across multiple divisions 
and sites but only for infection control – the remit of authority carried by this local 
champion. In both instances, attempts to win influence and sponsorship by senior 
management had proven futile.  
 
Yet the efforts extended were considerable. In Case C the development of the tool 
extended over 20 months with a small team comprising matron representatives and 
ward sisters from each division. This input was seen as crucial in building a sense of 
ownership of the toolkit across the trust. A three day event was organised involving 
matrons, infection control nurse, and other senior nurses and they reviewed a range of 
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sources to help assess the adequacy and suitability of the acquired toolkit. The 
standards were mapped against other source such as ‘Standards for Better Health’, 
‘Essence of Care’ and other methodologies. National standards were balanced 
alongside local needs.  
 
The exercise helped reduce the breadth of coverage so that the standards measured 
were judged to be the critical ones. Hence, the current version is shorter and simpler 
than that originally developed by Case A. Likewise, the amount of feed-in data is 
reduced compared with Case A. Criteria for inclusion covered external reporting 
requirements, whether proposed standards could be assessed with relevant evidence, 
and relevance to nurse practice improvement. A practice development unit helped to 
launch the package. Yet despite all these efforts adoption was only achieved in parts 
of the trust and it was rejected by other parts. 
 
 
Case E, Capital University NHS FT – an Alternative Model 
 
This case is notable in a number of key ways. First, this trust had designed and 
developed its own sophisticated version of the Case A toolkit. In this way this case is 
very different from Case B. It is also very different in that it has developed an 
electronic toolkit which is seen as strategically very important and central to the 
success of the trust as a whole. There was high-level and indeed top-down 
championing of the tool. Following on from the two previous points and perhaps most 
significant of all, the quality assurance toolkit developed in this case was regarded as 
so strategically important by the senior team that it was seen as offering a competitive 
edge. As such, far from wanting to see its wider adoption across the NHS there was a 
concern to keep it in-house as part of the organisations core capability. The fear was 
not a loss of IP in the sense of lost potential revenue from the technology itself, rather, 
far beyond that, the issue was that the toolkit had been ‘taken to another level’ beyond 
that developed by Case A (which Trust E was certainly aware of and had considered) 
and that, as such, it gave Trust E a commercial edge in a competitive metropolitan 
marketplace.  
 
This competitive advantage was perceived to stem from the improved and assured 
high quality of care which would result from the use of this ‘enhanced’ clinical 
quality assurance toolkit as it was embedded in a wider system of continuous 
improvement. Issues of earning license fees and the like from the IP of the package 
itself was of no interest to the developers within this trust. The focus was on earning a 
high reputation for good quality of care among its ‘customers’ – that is, GP 
commissioners, and patients.  
 
In line with this stance and this philosophy, Trust E was focused on using the toolkit 
as part of its improvement technologies package; the intent was to improve practice. 
The scores were seen as simply a guide and a trigger for a set of interventions that 
could then improve practice in an evidence-based manner. Accordingly, the original 
idea of using the label ‘Performance Scorecard’ was discarded in favour of ‘Quality 
Improvement Framework’.  
 
As with Case A and B, Capital University Trust had developed a core generic toolkit 
but additionally had developed tailored versions to fit the needs of specialist services 
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such as intensive care, midwifery and A&E. These units had to demonstrate 
conformance with the principles of the toolkit but they were also allowed to use 
different measures in certain aspects such as appropriate nutrition and hydration of 
patients – that is, parts of the ‘care bundle’ along with monitoring of falls and 
infections. 
 
Reflecting the elements discussed in the literature section, measurements were taken 
which covered structural features of the service offered (environment and staffing for 
example), process features (such as behaviours) and outcome measures. Key measures 
include hand hygiene, attention to sores and pressure damage, food and hydration, 
catheters and their use, measures of courtesy to patients and so on. As with the other 
cases, the focus was on nursing care. Following improvement methodology principles, 
this trust was using the data to track variances and to interrogate those in order to find 
patterns and root causes. Cross ward and care group comparisons were made and from 
this data reports were made through the clinical governance structure. As with the 
others a traffic light scoring system is used.  
 
The scope of the assessment is narrower than the toolkits used by cases A and B. 
Trust E has a clear focus on the assessment and improvement of nursing practice. 
This package, as mentioned, is less wide-ranging than that found in Case A ‘We get 
that other data from other places in our trust without using the Quality Improvement 
Framework’ (Operations Director). The wider set of data is brought together in a 
Trust wide scoreboard from a range of sources. But, ‘Our toolkit is very focused on 
nursing practice’. It was also noted that ‘In addition to our nursing care data, the CQC 
is also interested in other additional data that is found elsewhere in the trust, our data 
feeds-in to that overall picture, it does not seek to be the total answer to the need for 
compliance data’. The tool embraces and covers the elements found in the Department 
of Health’s Essence of Care set of guidelines and provides a means to show 
compliance with particular aspects of the CQC standards – those focusing on the care 
bundle but not those relating to patient choice or care planning etc which are covered 
elsewhere. The aim was said to be to keep the package simple, user-friendly and 
focused. The need for simplicity was said to arise because of the large size and 
complexity of the organisation and the high rate of staff turnover.  
 
A commercial partner offers IT development and support for the package; it most 
definitely does not have the authorisation to market it to other trusts. The infection 
control template was needed urgently for reporting purposes and a tender was issued 
which this commercial provider won. The data which populates the template remains 
in the ownership of the Trust.  
 
The data is described as ‘real time’; it is not reliant on an annual audit. The senior 
nurse and her team have direct access to the results for all wards on all sites. Monthly 
returns on most measures can be viewed in this way. The infection control 
measurement template component was developed by another large trust and 
developed further by the commercial partner. This package was then purchased by 
Case E and developed further in conjunction with the commercial partner. The aim 
was to do something much more than infection control but not to go so far as the 
holistic reporting system developed by Case A. The care bundle data is fed to the 
commercial partner and HR adds-in the relevant workforce data including nurse 
numbers and skill mix. The resulting monthly reports are taken to the monthly 
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professional practice committee and at intervals to the health and safety committee as 
well as the clinical governance committee of the board – ‘the same numbers are taken 
to each’.  
 
The extent of nurse involvement and engagement in the development of the package 
was not a priority. The toolkit was developed centrally but there is a plan to develop 
awareness and engagement among nurses at all levels. At present, the understanding 
and buy-in is mainly at ward manager level. Despite this, there is active use of the tool 
by senior nurses (Band 7). Each week they present aspects of the data from their 
wards to their peers from similar care groups and their site – usually an audience of 
about 40 staff. And once a month there is a Trust wide report back session. These 
reporting sessions help ensure that the data is used actively and they are used to hold 
people to account and to help ensure follow-up actions where required. Nurses in 
these sessions talk about their results and their action plans. MRSA and CDiff cases 
are benchmarked by care group against other hospital trusts. The improvement 
elements as well as the performance element is regarded in this case as crucial. The 
toolkit is used as a method to tackle patient care issues such as measuring falls or 
patient reporting of pain in cancer wards.  That said, a number of measures reflect 
CQC reporting requirements such as whether a call bell is within reach of all patients 
(though not the time taken for a nurse to respond). This case reveals that the motives 
for innovating can vary dramatically even within the context of the NHS and with 
reference to a similar technology. The case also reveals that adoption of innovative 
technologies within the NHS is just as likely to be enabled by top down determination 
as it is by bottom-up buy-in. 
Discussion and conclusions  
 
The issues underpinning the quality assurance technology examined in this paper were 
given high priority by the Department of Health; in addition, a number templates and 
support systems had been constructed at national level. Yet, despite these favourable 
conditions, the development and adoption of these technologies designed for quality 
improvement and assurance in basic nursing was limited and patchy. It would seem 
that there must be some systemic barriers to the wide diffusion of these kinds of 
innovation. The cases selected for study were those which had been specifically 
identified as having taken some steps to ether develop or adapt and adopt such 
technologies. Even in these cases, as described in the case presentations above, there 
were significant obstacles. There were also some clues as to how and why adoption 
can succeed. 
 
As reported earlier, the main body of literature on healthcare quality assurance tends 
to be prescriptive – the key elements are defined, described and recommended for 
action. But as revealed in the cases described above, the process of adoption is 
hindered by a number of factors. Some of these are quite subtle; in part they stem 
from varied motives, priorities and fears. Taken together, these five cases help shed 
light on the forces at play. 
 
The reasons for the overall lack of take-up of these quality assurance technologies can 
be picked out from the analyses of the cases above: there is an insularity between 
hospital sites and between departments within sites; there are high 
occupational/professional boundaries which obstruct smooth adoption (see also Ferlie 
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et al. 2005); there are legacy systems which staff tend to defend as they have become 
familiar with them (see also Greenhalgh et al. 2004); and, not least, new expenditure 
in times of financial stringency and cost-cutting makes the task of developing a 
‘business case’ hard work and discouraging.  The adoption decision (or as we have 
seen it is much more like a whole series of decisions) requires evidence of impact and 
cost effectiveness. Blocking opportunities arise at each stage. The 13 decision 
dimensions shown in Figure 1 were variously selected by the different cases and the 
decisions adopted reflected the situation in each of the trusts. For example, whether 
the scope of audit was wide or narrow, top down or bottom up, tended to reflect the 
power structures and priorities in the case sites. The precise detail of the option 
selected was secondary to the bigger issue of organisational power and priorites. 
 
In principle, the technologies (apart from the significant exception of the package 
developed by Case E) were available to other NHS trusts. In practice, adoption had 
been limited. Indeed, it is the relative lack of adoption which is the most instructive 
part of these cases. Even though in two of the cases a commercial partner had been 
enlisted to both develop the IT functionality and to market the resulting packages, the 
success in finding customers had been relatively weak. This is the more notable 
because the wider policy context emphasised the need for clinical governance and for 
robust procedures. Further, the regulatory regime also required assurances of the 
existence of systems and data of a kind which would seem to favour these packages. 
Despite this supportive backcloth, adoption beyond the originating trusts remained 
sticky.  
 
NHS hospital trusts have an evident need for clinical quality assurance tools. This is 
stimulated by requirements at a number of levels. Clinicians need some guidance 
about approved procedures and protocols governing care. Additionally, internal 
performance management and good clinical practice require systems of this kind. 
Beyond organisational boundaries, there is an external regulatory system which sets 
out expected standards and inspects against these. Overarching all of these is the 
national policy level which from times to time launches campaigns which prompt 
activity in line with such tools. The overall climate therefore is highly receptive to the 
development of the kinds of clinical assurance toolkits examined in this report. Yet, 
despite these ‘readiness for change’ signals, the adoption of the technologies 
described here remained curiously limited and circumscribed. Commercial technology 
partners who had helped the trusts develop their ideas had sought to market the 
packages to other trust – including publicising the availability and the advantages of 
these systems to all hospital trusts across the country. Not only was it difficult to sell 
these innovations into other trusts, but, as we have seen it was also difficult to 
disseminate good practice even within the ‘adopting trusts’. 
 
This limited diffusion reflects the bigger picture where even well-sponsored national 
level DH initiatives including Essence of Care have not been fully adopted. Key 
performance indicators stipulated at national level including Vital Signs are often 
collected at trust level rather than individual ward level. The toolkits described in this 
report, despite their limitations, could in general be considered as well ahead of the 
norm. The processes reported in this paper therefore give clues to the reasons 
underlying a more general pattern of non-adoption of new ideas in the NHS. 
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No single technology has dominated the market. A number of similar technologies 
have emerged – some of which have been adopted and adapted by trusts beyond the 
originating site and others which have been more or less restricted to the developer-
user location. Further, the scope of the technologies varies – some are narrowly 
focused on a specific aspect of clinical practice such as infection control while others 
are widely defined so that they seek to cater for the quality reporting requirements of 
the organisation and of its array of external audit and regulatory bodies in one single 
technology package.  
The study lends qualified support to the significance of the attributes highlighted by 
Rogers (2003). ‘Relative advantage’ of the quality assurance technologies was an 
important variable in each of the cases. But the social dimension to this was also 
revealed – that is, relative advantage was not purely a characteristic of the process but 
was also weighed in terms of patient impact and in most case special consideration 
was given to staff impact. ‘Compatibility with existing practices’ was also found to be 
important; but when it was seen as highly compatible the question was raised about 
why change should occur. ‘Complexity’ was also confirmed as a relevant factor. 
Nurse leaders/product champions were alert to the need to be able to demonstrate to 
nurse colleagues that the innovation would be easy to use. ‘Trialability’ was also 
important and for similar reasons as the attribute of complexity. ‘Observability’ of 
beneficial outcomes was less evident as a major concern unless that was understood as 
about nurse reassurance concerning ease of use. Finally, ‘Re-invention’ was 
significant in some of the cases as the scope for modification and adaption of the 
technology was a selling factor where there was some opposition, but less important 
when reassurance was gained through the proposition that the package as a whole was 
tried and tested elsewhere in the NHS. 
 
The hypothesis that insider, practitioner-developers would have some advantage in 
gaining acceptance for their innovations in their own immediate localities (Storey 
2011) was broadly supported by the case evidence. But the cases also indicated that 
this influence did not extend very far into other NHS organizations. Clinical quality 
assurance technologies may be a special case; the central actors tend to be nurses and 
they seem to have a strong focus on professional practice and on top-down directives. 
Marketing efforts from commercial providers find it difficult to compete with these 
twin priorities. This would suggest that where commercial providers have made 
inroads in cognate areas, their point of entry has been via board level directors where 
ease of governance has been a high priority. Systematic audit and reporting systems 
which embrace clinical practice but are not confined to it are then more easily 
mandated in a top-down manner. 
 
Despite the energy and commitment invested in the development of these toolkits by a 
number of individual champions, the process of take-up and adoption was usually 
problematical. This, in essence, is the problem that requires an answer. The cases 
suggest a number of possible reasons. 
 
Disseminating the technological innovations was in the main not a high priority for 
the key players. The main focus of ambition for the developers was to improve local 
practice. Beyond that, some were willing to share experience with other trusts if 
requested. There was one notable exception where the innovation was regarded as 
offering a competitive advantage to the trust as a whole and therefore its operating 
features were protected.  
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In the other cases, some developers had a strong personal interest in ‘technology’ and 
this provided an incentive for their involvement. Others – the majority – were highly 
focused on service improvement. A few would have liked to have external recognition 
for the innovation but this rarely seemed to be a significant driver. Protecting IP and 
securing an incline stream from the innovation hardly figured at all.  
 
There was sometimes a tension between honest self-appraisal so as to allow for 
improvement to practice and the urge to publicise ‘good news’. Different product 
champions handled this tension in different ways. Some placed the emphasis on one 
end of the spectrum or the other, while some sought to tailor the message to different 
kinds of audience.  
 
Cost was often mentioned by these developers as a factor which might ‘explain’ lack 
of adoption, but the relatively low sums at stake in these instances suggest that this 
cannot be the main issue. The bigger perceived costs were in overcoming the 
investment that all levels and types of staff had in their legacy systems. The toolkits 
provided relatively simple frameworks and procedures. Their adoption seemed to 
require a wider change management programme designed to ensure uniform adoption 
across a trust and a shift in behaviours including the cessation of well-established 
routines.  
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